|
an
acute judgment.
Others draw conclusions well where there are many premises.
For example, the former easily learn hydrostatics, where the premises are
few, but the conclusions are so fine that only the greatest acuteness can
reach them.
And in spite of that these persons would perhaps not be great
mathematicians, because mathematics contain a great number of premises, and
there is perhaps a kind of intellect that can search with ease a few
premises to the bottom and cannot in the least penetrate those matters in
which there are many premises.
There are then two kinds of intellect: the one able to penetrate acutely and
deeply into the conclusions of given premises, and this is the precise
intellect; the other able to comprehend a great number of premises without
confusing them, and this is the mathematical intellect. The one has force
and exactness, the other comprehension. Now the one quality can exist
without the other; the intellect can be strong and narrow, and can also be
comprehensive and weak.
3. Those who are accustomed to judge by feeling do not understand the
process of reasoning, for they would understand at first sight and are not
used to seek for principles. And others, on the contrary, who are accustomed
to reason from principles, do not at all understand matters of feeling,
seeking principles and being unable to see at a glance.
4. Mathematics, intuition.--True eloquence makes light of eloquence, true
morality makes light of morality; that is to say, the morality of the
judgement, which has no rules, makes light of the morality of the intellect.
For it is to judgement that perception belongs, as science belongs to
intellect. Intuition is the part of judgement,
It's me PA1G
|
Linear Mode
